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Positivity bias in past and future episodic thinking: relationship with anxiety, 
depression and retrieval induced forgetting. 
 
 
Positivity biases in autobiographical memory and in episodic future thinking are considered 
important in mental wellbeing, and are reduced in anxiety and depression. The inhibitory 
processes underlying retrieval induced forgetting (RIF) have been proposed to contribute to 
these biases. This investigation found reduced positivity in past and future thinking to be 
associated with reduced memory specificity alongside greater levels of anxiety, depression 
and rumination. Most notably however, RIF was found to significantly predict memory 
valence. This indicates that the RIF may be important in maintaining such biases, facilitating 
the forgetting of negative memories when a positive item is actively retrieved. 
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Introduction: 
 
Mental time travel is a unique human ability that provides us with the capacity to mentally reconstruct past 
events (episodic memory) and simulate potential future ones (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997) Despite the 
independence of episodic and prospective memory systems the underlying cognitive processes are intrinsically 
interrelated, relying on the same neural mechanisms and resources, often referred to as the ‘core network’ 
(Addis et al,. 2007, Schacter et al., 2008). Remembering involves the extraction and recombination of different 
aspects of an experience, in order to reconstruct a full episode or event (Addis et al., 2007, Suddendorf & 
Corballis 2007). Areas in the medial temporal cortex, the hippocampus in particular, are considered 
responsible for retrieving and binding stored information in a flexible manner, allowing construction of 
potential future events in addition to the reconstruction of past events (Slotnick, 2010). Indeed it is thought 
that the primary function of episodic memory is to retain information likely to be important for the future, with 
fragments of information from past experiences providing ‘building blocks’ that can be flexibly recombined to 
simulate hypothetical future events. (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007, Addis et al., 2007, Spreng and Grady, 
2010). This flexible construction of novel events allows us to mentally ‘try out’ different versions of such 
events and different behavioral responses (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Ingvar, 1979; 
Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), meaning we can anticipate and plan for the future 
(Davies & Stone, 1995, Pharm & Taylor et al., 1999). 
 
Whilst this ability  offers enormous adaptive benefits, it also allows for distortion and error in both memory 
and future simulations (Loftus, 2003; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Schacter, 1999, 2001). The 
recombination of selectively encoded, stored and retrieved memory traces is governed by the working self, and 
is therefore influenced by current beliefs, active goals and self-images (Conway, 2005). Priority tends to be 
given to information that is consistent with these self-images and beliefs, allowing us to create a sense of 
personal identity and coherent, albeit slightly biased view of the self (Schacter, 1996).  
 
Given a tendency to seek out positive experiences and avoid negative ones, it is perhaps not surprising that 
humans demonstrate a positivity bias in both episodic memory and future simulation (Sharot, 2011; Sharot et 
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al., 2007; Walker et al., 2003). Numerous studies have found that, whether cued voluntarily or involuntarily, 
more positive autobiographical events are generally recalled than negative ones (Berntsen, 1996; Clark et al., 
2013; Ditta & Storm, 2016; Thompson et al., 1996; Suedfeld & Eich, 1995; Waldfogel 1948; Walker et al., 
2003). This is also reflected in future episodic thinking; people spontaneously imagine more positive than 
negative events when asked to think about their future (Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003) and judge positive events 
as being more likely to happen (Weinstein, 1980). Such biases have also been observed in naturally occurring 
future episodic thoughts of young adults (Barsics et al. 2016).  
 
Though such biases result in inaccuracies in the way events are remembered and predicted, these biases are 
proposed to offer their own adaptive benefits that outweigh their costs (Ainslie, 2007). Both remembering and 
imagining the future play important roles in psychological wellbeing (Schacter et al., 2008). Evidence 
indicates that positive memories can be retrieved in order to repair negative mood (McFarland & Buehler, 
1998), whilst simulating positive future events are also thought to serve emotional regulation functions and 
decrease worry (Brown et al., 2002; D'argembeau & Van Der Linden 2007; Schacter et al. 2008; Taylor & 
Schneider, 1989; Taylor et al., 1998). Such positivity biases are associated with increased mental and physical 
wellbeing (Conversano et al., 2010), enhanced productivity, social bonding and ability to cope with stress 
(Taylor, 1989). Furthermore they are considered vital in maintaining positive views of one's self and one’s 
personal future (Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
 
In contrast, moderately depressed individuals tend to demonstrate a relatively unbiased and more realistic 
view of the self (Coyne and Gotlib, 1983) and the future (Strunk and Adler, 2009), whilst severely depressed 
individuals are less able to envisage positive future episodes (MacLeod et al., 1993) and show negative biases 
in future thinking (Miloyan et al. 2014, Roiser et al., 2012, Strunk et al., 2006), which can predict fatal 
outcomes (Oquendo et al., 2004).  Depression is also associated with greater recall of negative memories 
relative to positive ones (Blaney, 1986; Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Eich et al., 1994, Anderson & Evans, 2015). 
Indeed the overly generalised past and future thinking common in depression (Williams et al., 1996, Dickson 
& Bates 2005, MacLeod et al., 1993), is widely considered a protective mechanism to prevent the retrieval of 
destabilising unhappy memories (Williams et al., 1996). In contrast anxious individuals favour recollection of 
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threat-related memories and negative self-referential information (Mitte & Harris, 2008; Myers & Derakshan, 
2004), while social anxiety is associated with biases towards recalling more negative social autobiographical 
memories (Krans et al., 2014). It is not clear whether these negativity biases are anxiety or threat-specific, or 
whether they reflect a more general negativity bias in memory. However one might expect biases towards 
negative, threatening information to translate into an overall reduction in the positivity of memory. Increased 
simulation and anticipation of negative future events is also characteristic of anxiety disorders, alongside a 
greater tendency to believe future events will yield negative outcomes (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et 
al., 1997; Miloyan et al. 2014; Ruane et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2015).  
 
Both depression and anxiety are associated with a tendency towards rumination, repetitive intrusive 
thoughts and self-reflections, often negative in focus, dwelling on the same distressing memories for long 
periods of time (Kuo et al., 2012, Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins, 2008, 
Wilkinson et al., 2013). It has been suggested that predisposition to rumination may be due to difficulty 
inhibiting unwanted memories (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Indeed high trait rumination is associated with 
enhanced recollection of negative words compared to neutral and positive words (Kuo et al., 2012), and 
increased recall of and focus on negative memories (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998), whilst a single session of 
repeated negative memory retrieval has been found to negatively affect mood and establish biased recall a 
week later (Vrijsen et al. 2016).  
 
Norby (2015) argues that the act of forgetting plays a vital role in maintaining mental wellbeing by limiting 
access to negative memories, promoting a positive outlook. Indeed it appears positivity biases in memory are 
driven by top-down, goal-directed processes, with little evidence to suggest that the strength of such positivity 
biases are effected at memory encoding stages (Hess et al., 2013). Retrieval Induced Forgetting (RIF), a 
phenomenon in which the selective retrieval of a particular memory trace causes the forgetting of another rival 
memory trace (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994), has been put forward as a potential mechanism by which the 
positivity bias in memory occurs (Storm & Jobe, 2012). RIF is demonstrated by exposing participants to a list 
of category-exemplar pairs (e.g. Fruit - banana, Metal - silver).  Retrieval practice of a subset of exemplars (e.g 
Fruit - ba_____?) inhibits subsequent retrieval of unpracticed exemplars belonging to the same category (eg. 
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orange), but not the retrieval of exemplars from a different unpracticed category (e.g. silver). As one would 
expect, there is typically enhanced recall, or ‘facilitation’, of practiced items. However, RIF of unpracticed 
exemplars from practiced categories is also a robust and consistently observed phenomenon (Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995; Bäuml & Hartinger, 2002; Edginton and Rusted, 2003; Groome & Sterkaj 2010; Potts et al., 
2011).  
 
This RIF effect is believed to be due to inhibition; when a retrieval cue activates non-target items in 
addition to the target memory, inhibition of non-target items resolves the competition, rendering non-target 
items less accessible, both in the moment and after a delay (Anderson, 2003; Anderson & Spellman, 1995; 
Edginton and Rusted, 2003; Murayama et al., 2014; Storm & Levy, 2012).  
 
It should be noted that other theoretical accounts have been put forward, which suggest that the 
phenomenon can be explained by non-inhibitory, competition based mechanisms (eg Jonker et al. 2013; 
MacLeod et al. 2003; Verde, 2012). For example, it has been argued that retrieval of a subset of items 
strengthens those items and causing interference with other non-strengthened items, preventing non-
strengthened items from being successfully retrieved. However it has been shown that RIF is cue-independent 
(Anderson & Spellman, 1995), competition dependent (Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 2000; Jonker & Macleod, 
2012) retrieval specific (Anderson & Bell, 2001) and independent of the level to which practiced items are 
strengthened (Storm & Levy, 2012). These findings, while consistent with the inhibitory account of RIF, 
cannot be explained by alternative theories of RIF. In addition, evidence from the psychopharmacological 
literature demonstrates an enhancing effect of nicotine on RIF, consistent with cholinergic accounts of 
inhibition that require effortful processing (Edginton and Rusted, 2003). While not excluding the potential for 
other factors to play a role in RIF, a recent meta-analysis provided strong support for the role of inhibition in 
RIF (Murayama et al. 2014), which is the most widely accepted view. 
 
It has been proposed that these inhibitory mechanisms may act to reduce accessibility of negative items in 
autobiographical memory when a positive memory is actively retrieved (Storm & Jobe, 2012). Indeed 
associations have been made between RIF and reduced ability to recall negative memories (Storm & Jobe, 
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2012), whilst a paradigm adapted to examine RIF of autobiographical memories found RIF of negative but not 
positive memories (Wessel & Hauer 2006). RIF has also been associated with decreased imagination of 
negative future events (Giebl et al., 2015), proposed to be a result of the similar underlying mechanisms at 
play in episodic memory and future simulation. Specifically it is suggested that positive memory biases 
increase accessibility to positive information with which to construct future mental representations.  
 
In addition, both anxiety and depression are associated with reduced RIF (Law et al., 2012; Groome & 
Sterkaj, 2010; Sterkaj et al, under review), consistent with widely held views of anxiety, depression and 
ruminative thinking relating to inhibitory deficits (Eysenck et al., 2007; Eugene et al., 2010, Whitmer & 
Banich, 2010). RIF appears to be involved in the suppression of unwanted, intrusive memories, with decreased 
RIF in individuals suffering from such memories (Groome & Pipilis, 2008). Storm & Jobe (2012) postulate 
that impairments in RIF, reducing ability to inhibit negative thoughts and memories, may increase 
vulnerability to depression.  
 
This study was designed to further explore the established relationship between RIF and biases in both 
autobiographical memories and future simulations. Previous studies by Storm & Jobe (2012) and Giebl et al. 
(2015) found relationships between positivity biases and RIF based on the number of positively valenced past 
or future episodes relative to the number of negative episodes that participants could generate. Participants 
were thereby constrained in their retrieval search by the valence category (positive or negative). This study 
investigated whether such a pattern was still evident when participants reminisced and imagined future events 
freely as in response to neutral cue words, and self-rated the valence of these episodes, rather than being asked 
to generate episodes in predetermined valence categories. Such free recall and future episodic simulation is a 
greater reflection of natural everyday memory retrieval and future simulation, giving an indication of whether 
these findings are relevant outside of the laboratory. Specifically the study examined whether positive valence 
in memory and future episodic thinking related to higher levels of RIF. In addition, RIF, valence of memory 
and future imagining, ability to retrieve specific autobiographical memories and future simulations, were 
examined in relation to individual differences in levels of anxiety, depression and rumination.  
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Storm & Jobe (2012) suggest that RIF may be an even stronger predictor of positivity bias in memory of older adults, given their particularly strong avoidance of negative information both in the present and in memory (Carstensen et al., 1999; Mather & Carstensen, 2005), and increases in markers of emotional wellbeing with age (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2008; Stone et al., 2010). Age was therefore accounted for in 
the present study.  Depression and anxiety are also associated with increased rates of smoking (Covey et al. 
1998; Johnson et al. 2000; Patton et al. 1998). Given that nicotine has been found to increase inhibitory control 
via mediation of the cholinergic system ( Edginton & Rusted, 2003; Rusted & Alverez, 2008), it was 
considered important to take into account whether participants had recently smoked, in case this mediated the 
relationship between mood and RIF.   
 
Depression is widely associated with reduced ability to recall specific memories (William & Broadbent, 
1986; Dalgleish et al., 2007; Williams & Scott, 1988; Sumner et al., 2010) and imagine specific future events 
(Williams et al. 1996), even at sub-clinical levels (Ramponi et al. 2004). In cued recall tasks, depressed 
individuals tend to report significantly fewer specific memories than healthy controls, instead reporting classes 
of events (e.g. ‘I’ve  always failed exams’) or referring to extended time periods (e.g.’my first semester at 
University’) (Williams et al. 2007). This over-general memory is thought to be a result of premature 
termination of the hierarchical memory search process at a point where only general, descriptive information 
has been accessed (Conway & Pledydell-Pearce, 2000). This is proposed to be a defensive mechanism, an 
avoidance of specific memories that, where there is already depressed mood, are likely to be negative in nature 
(Williams et al., 1996; 2007). Given such depressive tendencies to fail to recall a specific memory on cued-
recall tasks (Williams et al. 2007), the numbers of past and future episodes that could be generated were taken 
into account here as an indicator of memory specificity. It was anticipated that reduced ability to generate 
specific past and future episodes might relate to a reduced positivity in any episodes that could be provided. 
 
An overall positivity bias was predicted in both remembering and future imagining, in which more positive 
than negative events would be generated.  Individual differences in levels of anxiety, depression and rumination 
were hypothesised to negatively predict the degree of bias towards positive episodes. Whilst facilitation was not 
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anticipated to relate to such biases, RIF was expected to predict greater positivity bias in both remembered and 
imagined future episodes.  
 
Methods: 
 
Participants and design: 
An a priori power analysis was conducted to determine the sample size. Assuming a medium (0.15) effect 
size with a significance level of α = .05 and a statistical power of 0.80, a minimum sample of 103 participants 
was necessary (Faul et al. 2009). Assuming a drop-out rate of approximately 10-15% (Hoerger, 2010), we 
aimed to recruit at least 113 participants.  
Participants were recruited via advertisement in email circulars, on social media pages of community 
organisations in London and by word of mouth. A total of 119 participants volunteered to take part, having 
read a detailed information sheet and provided their informed consent.  They did so via the online survey 
platform Qualtrics.12 participants who did not correctly complete the full experiment were excluded. The final 
sample of 107 participants consisted of 87 women and 20 men between the ages of 18-65 (mean age = 32.04, 
SD = 12.91). All participants were English speaking and had no known memory disorders. A survey design 
was used in which all participants completed RIF, autobiographical future thinking and memory tasks and 
anxiety, depression and rumination measures for multiple regression analysis.  
 
 
RIF and facilitation:  
RIF was measured using the original paradigm established by Anderson et al., (1994). Participants first 
studied a series of category-exemplar pairs (e.g. Fruit – banana; Metal - silver). The 8 categories used were 
taken directly from Appendix C of Anderson et al., (1994), as were the 6 exemplars for each category. 
Specifically, the “strong exemplars” (exemplars with an average taxomic frequency rank order of 8) from 
Anderson et al., (1994 Experiment 1) were used. Strong exemplars (e.g Fruit - orange) were found to produce 
a more robust RIF effect than weak exemplars (e.g. Fruit - guava) (Anderson et al. 1994).  
 
10  
 After studying each of these 48 category-exemplar pairs for approximately 5 seconds each, participants 
were asked to practice retrieving a subset of exemplars from a subset of categories. This retrieval practice 
phase involved completing a retrieval cue comprised of word stem of an exemplar presented alongside its 
category (e.g. Fruit - ba____?). Half of the exemplars from half of the categories were practiced 3 times each, 
resulting in a total of 36 retrieval practice trials. The specific subset of practiced category-exemplar pairs were 
counterbalanced, such that participants were randomly allocated 1 of 4 possible sets of pairs to practice.  
Following this, participants were required to take a 10 minute break. Though the original paradigm involves a 
20 minute distractor task, a reliable RIF effect has since been found with breaks as short as 5 minutes (Storm 
& Jobe 2012; Rowland et al. 2014).  
A final category-cued recall phase presented each of the 8 category names and required participants to give 
as many of the original 6 exemplars from each category as they could. The order of the category cues was 
randomised. Number of recalled practiced exemplars from practiced categories (RP+), unpracticed exemplars 
from practiced categories (RP-) and unpracticed exemplars from unpracticed categories (NRP) could then be 
compared.  Replicating the methods used by Storm & Jobe (2012), a single RIF score was obtained by 
subtracting final recall performance for RP- exemplars from NRP exemplars, with higher scores indicating 
greater RIF. Facilitation scores were calculated by deducting NRP recall performance from RP+ recall 
performance, with higher scores indicating greater retrieval practice effects.  
 
Autobiographical recall and future simulation: 
10 neutral cue words (e.g. grass, bread)(appendix 1) served as retrieval cues to prompt recall of 
autobiographical memories. Participants were instructed to generate and provide a brief description of a 
specific remembered event associated with each cue word. Memories could be from any time ranging from 
childhood to recent memories but could not be memories from the past week. Participants were asked to 
provide specific contextual details, such as when and where the event took place and how old they were at the 
time, to ensure a specific event was retrieved. An example of an appropriate memory description was provided 
at the start of this section (appendix 1). If a memory was not retrieved within approximately 1 minute 
participants were instructed to move on to the next word. Following each cue word participants rated the 
valence of the retrieved memory on a 7-point numerical rating scale  (negative-positive).  
11  
 
This procedure was replicated for future episodic thinking with a new set of 10 neutral words. This time 
participants were required to imagine a specific future event associated with the word, again rating the valence 
of this event. The order of completion of these memory and future imagining stages were counterbalanced, as 
were the sets of 10 cue words used for remembering and future imagining.  
 
The written descriptions of both past and future events were individually checked for validity and 
specificity prior to analysis. Memories were counted as specific if they described a single event or episode that 
lasted less than one day, and the number of  specific episodes provided (out of a possible 10) was used as an 
indicator of participants’ ability to generate specific memories and future episodes, (as per Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986;  see Williams et al 2007 for a review). 
 
Average valence scores for autobiographical memory and imagined future events were calculated by later 
converting the valence scores into a scale of -1 (negative), 0 (neutral) and +1 (positive). The average valence 
score for memories and future imagined events were each calculated such that more positive scores reflected a 
greater number of positively valenced events, whilst more negative scores indicated more negatively valenced 
events. Valence scores were calculated in this manner to overcome the potential for strong negative and strong 
positive valence scores to cancel one another out.  
 
Measuring Depression, Anxiety and Rumination levels: 
Anxiety and depression levels were assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scales (HADS) 
(Zigmond & Snaith, 1983. This 14 item self-report measure provides an assessment of both anxiety and 
depression, with 7 items each (Watson et al., 1995). Participants are asked to rate statements such as ‘I feel 
tense or wound up’ (anxiety subscale) and ‘I feel cheerful’ (depression subscale, reverse scored), according to 
how they have been feeling over the past week. Despite its brevity the HADS has good internal consistency 
and concurrent validity (Bjelland et al., 2002). Reported Cronback’s coefficients (α) for anxiety and 
depression subscales are .80 and .76 respectively (Mykletun et al., 2001). Though initially validated for use in 
non-psychiatric hospital outpatients, it has since been validated for use in general populations (Kjaergaard et 
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al., 2014). Each item is scored from 0-3, with total scores for anxiety and depression each ranging from 0-21.  
Higher scores are indicative of higher levels of depression and anxiety with scores categorised as follows: 
Normal 0-7, mild 8-10, moderate 11-14 and severe 15-21 (Snaith & Zigmond, 1994).  
 
Rumination was assessed using the Ruminative Response Scale (RSS), part of the RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema 
& Morrow, 1991). This 22 items measure asks participants how often they engage in ruminative thought 
patterns when they are feeling sad or down. Each item is rated on a 1 (almost never) -4 (almost always) likert 
scale. The RRS is a reliable and valid measure of rumination (see for an overview Luminet, 2004), with high 
internal consistency (reported Cronbach’s coefficient of .91 (Moberly et al. 2008)). Scores range from 22-88 
with higher scores indicative of higher levels of ruminative thinking.  
 
 
Procedure: 
Participants completed the RIF study phase and retrieval practice phase. During the break the participants 
were asked to provide some basic demographic information, smoking status (never - multiple times per day) 
and time since their last cigarette. Having then completed the final test phase of the RIF procedure, 
participants completed the episodic memory and future episodic thinking tasks in the order to which they had 
been randomly assigned. Finally the HADS and RSS were completed. All participants provided their informed 
consent before taking part, and the procedure was carried out in accordance with the British Psychological 
Society’s code of human research ethics (2014). This study received ethical approval from the University of 
Westminster’s ethics committee. 
 
Results: 
Descriptive statistics for all included variables are reported in Table 1, with additional demographic 
information in (Appendix 2). 
 
    Out of the total 107 participants who completed the study, 8% were moderately-severely depressed (HADs 
scores of 11-21); 13% were mildly depressed (scoring between 8-10) and 79% scored within normal ranges (0-
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7). In terms of anxiety, 31% scored in the moderate-severe range (11-21), 27% in the mild anxiety range (8-
10); and 42% within normal ranges (0-7). 9 participants held a current anxiety disorder diagnosis, whilst 11 
were diagnosed with depression.  
 
Positivity bias: 
Memories and imagined future events were categorised into positive, negative and neutral events by their 
valence ratings such that valence ratings of -3 to -1, 0 and 1 to 3 were scored as negative (-1), neutral (0), or 
positive (1) respectively. A positivity bias was observed with positive mean valence scores for both memory 
(M=0.211, SD=0.374) and future episodic thinking (M=0.431, SD=0.417). On average, valence of future episodic thinking was significantly more positive than memory valence (t=-4.8, df = 106, p < .001, 
d=0.56, two-tailed). 
 
Out of a possible total of 10 episodes, significantly more positive than negative episodes were reported in 
both the memory (positive M=5.383, SD=1.984, negative M=3.206, SD=1.985) (t=-6.271, df=106, p<.0001, 
d=1.10, two-tailed) and future thinking (positive M=6.570 SD=2.093, negative M=2.365, SD=1.949) (t=-
11.260, df=106, p<.0001, d=2.08, two-tailed) tasks.  
 
Retrieval induced forgetting: 
The mean number of items recalled at the final test stage of the RIF procedure is reported in figure 1. More 
RP+ items were recalled than NRP or RP-. More importantly, significantly fewer RP- items (M=0.998, 
SD=0.672) were recalled than NRP items (M=1.284, SD=0.592) (t=-6.163, df=106, p<.0001, d=0.45, two-
tailed), demonstrating a significant RIF effect. 
 
 Of the 107 participants, only eight smoked daily (Appendix 2), and smoking status was not found to 
correlate significantly with RIF score (rs=.036, N=107, p=.710, two-tailed). Further, the positive correlation 
was found between time since last cigarette (12hrs, 24hrs, >24hrs) and RIF score was not significant (rs=.135, 
N=107, p=.167, two-tailed). 
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Figure 1 
Average number of RP+, RP- and NRP items retrieved in the final test phase of the RIF procedure.  
  
 
 
Multivariable relationships: 
Bivariate correlations between variables are reported in Table 1. As one would expect, there were 
significant positive correlations between rumination, anxiety and depression scores, and between overall 
valence of memories and future episodic events.  Lower rumination, anxiety and depression scores also 
significantly correlated with more positive past and future episodic thinking. The number of memories and 
future events generated positively correlated with the respective valence scores, and negatively correlated with 
the various mood-related measures. Facilitation negatively correlated with memory valence, whilst significant 
positive correlations were observed between RIF and memory valence. The positive correlation between RIF 
and the valence of future episodic thinking did not reach significance, but it was not significantly different 
from the significant correlation between RIF and memory valence (Z = .706), p = .48). 
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These were followed up by two separate multiple linear regressions, computed using the enter method of 
variable entry. First, RIF, facilitation, rumination, anxiety and depression scores and number of memories 
generated were entered as predictors of mean valance of episodic memory. The complete model was 
significant, F(7,99)=12.361, p<.0001), explaining 42.9% of variance (Adj. R²=.429). As table 2 shows, RIF 
and number of specific memories generated were significant positive predictors of memory valence whilst 
facilitation was a negative predictor of memory valence.  
 
Secondly, memory valence scores, number of future episodes generated, RIF, facilitation, rumination, 
anxiety and depression scores were entered as predictors of mean future episode valence. The complete model 
was significant, F(8,98)=9.365, p<.0001, explaining 38.7% of variance (Adj. R² =.387). As table 3 shows, the 
average number of specific future episodes that could be generated was the only significant predictor, 
positively relating to future episode valence. Multicollinearity was not a limiting issue in either regression.  
 
 
Table 1: 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between variables entered into the multiple regression. N=107 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Mean memory valence   .293** .630*** .329*** .187* -.258** -.135 -.131 -.183* -.041 
(2) Mean future valence       .618*** .106 -.134 -.264** -.231* -.249** .066 
(3) Number of memories         .070 -.143 -.167* -.080 -.122 -.036 
(4) Number of future episodes         -.016 -.140 -.219* -.197* -.224* -.069 
(5) RIF           -.024 .002 .158 .136 .066 
(6) Facilitation       -.058 .011 -.016 .151 
(7) Rumination score             .513*** .539*** -.216* 
(8) Anxiety score               .593*** -.237* 
(9) Depression score                 .074 
(10) Age                    
 MEAN 0.211 0.432 8.953 8.822 1.159 0.942 44.243 8.523 4.373 32.037 
 SD 0.376 0.419 1.944 1.980 1.921 0.521 15.007 4.548 3.699 12.908 
Note. Number of memories = number of cue words for which a memory could be generated, Number of future episodes = number 
of cue words for which a future episode could be generated, RIF = retrieval induced forgetting score (NRP - RP-). 
* p < .05    ** p < .005     *** p < .0005 
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Table 2: Regression coefficients for the regression predicting valence of autobiographical memories with 
RIF, rumination, anxiety, depression, age and number of memories generated. 
 
  B SE β t p Tolerance VIF 
Number of memories .112 .015 .582 7.685 <.0005 .940 1.064 
RIF .033 .015 .169 2.233 .028 .946 1.057 
Facilitation -.122 .054 -.170 -2.247 .027 .946 1.057 
Rumination score .001 .002 .053 .557 .579 .600 1.668 
Anxiety score -.005 .008 -.057 -.564 .574 .531 1.884 
Depression score -.013 .010 -.133 -1.285 .202 .506 1.978 
Age .001 .002 .002 .024 .981 .800 1.251 
        
                
 
Additional regression analyses were then run to check for any interactions between RIF and anxiety, 
depression or facilitation in predicting the valence of memories and future episodes. The variables were 
centred and the interaction terms anxiety*RIF, depression*RIF and facilitation*RIF entered into both 
regressions. The interaction term depression*RIF was significant in the model predicting memory valence 
(B=.011, SEb=.005, β=.196, t=2.10, p=.038), remaining significant in a model including only the main 
effects and interaction (F(8,97)=10.339, p<.0005, Adj. R²=.442). The interaction is illustrated in figure 2. 
Whilst there was a positive association between RIF and memory valence for the normal and mildly 
depressed groups, the opposite was the case for the moderately-severely depressed group, were a negative 
relationship was observed. None of the other interactions were significant in either regression. 
Table 3: Regression coefficients for the regression predicting valence of future episodes with RIF, rumination, 
anxiety, depression, age, memory valence and number of future episodes generated. 
 
  B SE β t p Tolerance VIF 
Number of future episodes .120 .018 .566 6.801 <.0005 .836 1.196 
Memory valence .052 .096 .046 .540 .590 .788 1.268 
RIF .025 .017 .116 1.450 .150 .904 1.106 
Facilitation -.048 .065 -.060 -.743 .459 .897 1.115 
Rumination score -.001 .003 -.053 -.539 .591 .600 1.666 
Anxiety score -.002 .010 -.026 -.250 .803 .528 1.894 
Depression score -.011 .012 -.093 -.866 .389 .498 2.007 
Age .003 .003 .098 1.148 .254 .794 1.259 
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Discussion: 
Positivity biases in both past and future thinking are commonly observed and are considered to play an 
important role in mental wellbeing. The present findings support this theory, observing an overall positivity 
bias in both temporal directions, the extent of which related to individual differences in levels of anxiety, 
depression and rumination within a subclinical population. Specifically, the mean valence of memories 
retrieved correlated negatively with depression, whilst greater positivity in future thinking related to lower 
levels of anxiety, depression and rumination. Further, whilst number of episodes retrieved significantly 
predicted the overall average valence of past and future episodes, higher levels of rumination correlated with 
the retrieval of fewer memories and fewer future episodes were generated with increasing depression, 
Figure 2: Interaction between depression, RIF and memory valence.  Depression level grouped by HADs score (normal – 0-7, mild – 8-10, moderate-severe – 11-21).  
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anxiety and rumination. Importantly, individual RIF levels were found to significantly relate to the valence 
of memories, indicating that RIF may contribute to such positivity biases.  
 
The observed positivity biases in memory reflect previous findings, with average proportions of positive 
(53.83%) and negative (32.5%) memories falling within previously found ranges (see Walker at al., 2003 for 
a review). The imagined future was even more positively biased, again replicating previous findings 
(Grysman et al. 2013, Sharot et al. 2007). Given that the future is less constrained than the past, and therefore 
more susceptible to influence of current personal goals, this is perhaps unsurprising  (Sharot & Dolan, 2012; 
Shao, 2010). Nonetheless, past and future positivity was significantly correlated, adding to the growing body 
of evidence indicating shared mechanisms underlying remembering and imagining processes (Schacter et al. 
2008).  
Such biases are also proposed to enhance mental wellbeing by helping to create a positive and coherent 
self-identity within the framework of a continually improving self (Conway 2005; D’argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004;  Schacter, 1996; Taylor & Brown, 1988) and can help regulate current emotions (Josephson et 
al.1996; McFarland & Buehler, 1998; D’Argembeau & Van Der Linden, 2007; Schacter, 2008).  
 
Though in this sample, valence of remembered or imagined episodes were not significantly predicted by  
levels of anxiety, depression or rumination, the significant correlational relationships observed within a non-
clinical sample with largely low-mild (0-10) HADS scores (Snaith & Zigmond, 1994), demonstrate their 
importance. Particularly interesting is the temporal direction (past and future) of these relationships. Whilst 
anxiety, depression and rumination all significantly negatively correlated with future positivity, only 
depression significantly correlated with memory valence scores. Indeed whilst anxiety is commonly 
associated with reduced positivity in future outlook (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al., 1997; 
Steinman et al. 2013 ), findings of biases in memory are less consistent (Burke & Mathews, 1992; Levy & 
Mineka, 1998, Rapee et al., 1994), and tend to be specific to threat related material (Becker et al., 1994; 
Saunders 2012; Myers & Derakshan, 2004; Mitte & Harris, 2008) rather than the  general negativity that 
appears to characterise depressive memory (Macleod & Salaminiou, 2001; Macleod et al., 1997; Strunk et al. 
2006). Indeed the present findings support Beck et al.'s 1987 proposal that whilst anxiety centres on 
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prospective threat and harm, depression centres on hopelessness, loss and self-deprecation that permeates 
thinking about both the past and future. It is the uncertainty specific to future events that is thought to be 
critical in producing high levels of anxiety (Eysenck et al. 2006).  More recent studies support this theory, 
reporting that anxiety disorders relate to an anticipated future threat or harm, whilst depression is more often 
associated with experiencing the loss of something that was valued (Finlay-Jones & Brown, 1981, Surtees, 
1995; Sandin et al., 2004). Not only does this split provide interesting insight into the subtle differences 
underlying the pathology of anxiety and depression, the common neural mechanisms underlying 
remembering and imagining, and the related relationship between characteristics of both past and future 
episodic thinking may contribute to the common co-morbidity between these two conditions.  
 
The present study also finds anxiety, depression and rumination relate to the number of future episodes 
that could be generated, whilst negative rumination related to retrieval of fewer specific autobiographical 
memories. Ruminative thought is theorised to contribute to the reduced ability of depressed individuals to 
access specific memories, via its domination of working memory capacity (Barnard et al., 2006; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Williams et al., 2007). Indeed the present findings support previous evidence for such 
a relationship between negative rumination and overgeneralised memory (Sutherland et al., 2007; Watkins et 
al. 2001; Sumner et al. 2011). Such overgeneralised memory is considered a defence mechanism against the 
retrieval of negative or distressing memories (Hermans et al., 2005; Haque et al. 2014). It is thought that this 
strategy may arise when valence of specific memories become increasingly negative and intrusive in nature, 
as is typical in depression (Lyubomirsky et al. 1998, Meiser-Stedman et al., 2012), for example when novel 
memory cues are mapped on to negative ruminative thought dominating current working memory capacity 
(Haque et al. 2014; Williams et al. 1996). Indeed the present findings support such a hypothesis, with 
significant correlations between the number of both past and future episodes generated and their average 
valence, though a causal relationship cannot be concluded based on this correlational design. It seems likely 
that similar processes may occur in anxiety related worry and imagined future events (Mclaughlin et al., 
2007).  
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This is particularly interesting in the context of the present findings relating RIF to the average valence of 
memories. Level of RIF was found to significantly predict average autobiographical memory valence such 
that increased RIF related to more positive autobiographical memory. These findings further those of Storm 
& Jobe (2012), finding a relationship between RIF and the average self-rated valence of memories freely 
retrieved in response to a set of neutral cue words, rather than valence determined by the total number of 
memories that could be retrieved in explicitly stated positive or negative retrieval categories. This free recall 
in response to neutral memory cues is a greater reflection of the way memory operates in everyday life, and 
therefore provides further support for the theorised role of RIF in promoting and maintaining such biases.  
 
    Storm, Bjork & Bjork (2005) describe RIF as a ‘memory modifier’, with retrieved items becoming 
more accessible whilst other information associated with the same retrieval cues become less recallable. 
Over time, such retrieval processes act to update, shape and sometimes distort memory. As suggested by 
Storm & Jobe (2012), a predisposition towards positivity may increase the likelihood of negative information 
being deemed inappropriate and therefore targeted by inhibition, rendering it inaccessible to consciousness, 
shaping memory in a positively valenced direction. Indeed RIF procedures adapted to study autobiographical 
memories have found that retrieval practice of certain memories can reduce accessibility of related memories 
(Barnier et al., 2004; Hauer & Wessel, 2006).  Some studies have indicated a possible bias in RIF itself, with 
greater forgetting of negative relative to positive material (Hauer & Wessel 2006; Harris et al., 2010, 
Experiment 1); and reduced RIF of negative, but not neutral items in anxious individuals (Saunders, 2012). 
However, such findings have been inconsistent (Barnier et al., 2004; Stone, Barnier, et al., 2013; Stone, 
Luminet, et al., 2013). Whilst not discounting the role of differences in inhibitory control of negative relative 
to positive or neutral material, the current study finds a relationship between memory positivity and 
independently measured RIF of neutral word pairs, indicating that, to some extent, general ability to inhibit 
non-target items during active retrieval of a specific target item relates to positivity biases in memory. Such 
inhibitory abilities alone would not be sufficient to generate these biases; rather they may work in 
combination with natural tendencies towards positively valenced memories to increase biases. When general 
biases are demonstrated towards the active retrieval of positive memories, RIF may help to maintain and 
enhance such biases by facilitating the forgetting of associated negative material.  
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Not only do depressed individuals lack the bias towards positive information memory (Blaney 1986; 
Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Anderson & Evans 2015; current findings), but it appears RIF is also reduced both 
in severe clinical depression (Groome & Sterkaj, 2010), and anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007; Law et al., 2012; 
Saunders 2012). Though the present study did not find significant relationship between RIF and either 
depression or anxiety scores, it should be noted that previous such findings have been found in cases of 
severe depression and anxiety levels, or high state anxiety (Potts et al. 2012; Saunders 2013; Groome & 
Sterkaj, 2010) therefore these findings should not be considered contradictory. Moulds & Kandris (2006) 
also found no association between RIF and dysphoria in a normal student sample. It may be that, in mild 
depression, RIF-facilitated forgetting of negative memories is compromised by reduced active retrieval of 
positive memories, leading to more negative overall memory valence without a reduction in RIF itself. 
However, in the context of the greater negativity biases observed in severe depression, RIF may become 
counterproductive, further increasing access to negative autobiographical memories.  
 
The interaction that appeared between RIF and depression would support this conclusion. RIF was 
positively associated with memory valence in the groups obtaining HADS-D scores within normal and mild 
ranges. However, the moderate-severe depression group showed the opposite pattern; greater RIF was 
associated with reduced memory positivity. This may well be a reflection of the tendency towards 
pessimistic, mood congruent memory retrieval in severe depression, contrasting with the positivity bias of 
healthy individuals (Miloyan et al. 2014; Roiser et al. 2012, Rusting et al. 2010)). Whilst active retrieval of 
positive memories may facilitate forgetting of associated negative memories (via RIF), it may be that when 
there is a bias towards negative memory retrieval (in severe depression), competing positive memories are 
inhibited. As such, high RIF levels alongside negative memory retrieval tendencies would be 
disadvantageous, worsening existing negativity biases. The tendency for RIF to be reduced in severe 
depression may therefore reflect a protective mechanism; an attempt to reduce cycles of negative memory 
retrieval. Such reductions may also contribute to over-general memory tendencies in depression (Groome & 
Sterjak, 2010; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). When attempting to retrieve a specific item from memory, the 
ability to inhibit competing memory traces that are activated by the same cue is essential (Anderson, 2003). 
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Decreased RIF is associated with reduced ability to inhibit non-target memories (Storm & Bui, 2015; Aslan 
& Bauml, 2011). Reduced RIF may thereby contribute to over-general memory tendencies in depression, 
reducing access to specific memories that are likely to be negative in nature. The present findings of greater 
memory negativity in depressed individuals showing higher RIF levels would support this theory, though the 
small number of participants within the moderate-severely depressed group should be taken into account.  
 
Though the small number of smokers in this study limited the influence of nicotinic modulation of RIF 
(Edginton & Rusted, 2003; Rusted & Alvers, 2008), the apparent relationship between RIF and positivity 
biases may well be implicated in the use of smoking as a form of self-medication. Smoking is indeed 
particularly common in depressed and anxious groups of people, thought to be due, in part, to its ability to 
regulate negative affect (Schleicher et al. 2009). Nicotinic augmentation of inhibitory processes including 
RIF may help reduce the intrusively of negative thoughts and memories, contributing to the regulation of 
negative emotion.  
Whilst RIF positively related to memory valence, the degree to which retrieval practice increased later 
recall of practiced items (facilitation) was found to negatively predict memory valence. Though this 
relationship was not anticipated, it does follow that, while inhibitory abilities related to greater positivity 
bias, factors that increase recall of repeatedly retrieved items related to reduced positivity bias in memory. 
The repeated retrieval of a target memory during the retrieval practice phase of RIF is, it could be argued, 
similar to the processes involved during rumination about a specific event or memory (Vrijsen et al. 2016). 
Habitually ruminating on certain memories has been found to increase future recall of the same those 
memories (Hertel et al. 2017; Vrijsen et al. 2016). A greater level of facilitation may augment the extent to 
which rumination influences the nature of later memory retrieval. Given that this type of ruminative thinking 
tends to be negative in nature (Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 2008), individual differences in the degree to which 
memory practice increases the strength of a memory may therefore effect the degree to which an episode of 
negative rumination influences overall memory valence. Greater facilitation may lead to greater influence of 
negative retrieval practice on overall memory valence. Given that the repeated imagination of the same 
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specific future episode is less common than rumination over a past event, it follows that the correlation 
between facilitation and the valence of future episodic thinking did not reach significance.   
 
The current study did not find RIF to significantly predict the valence of future episodic thinking, 
contrasting with Giebl et al.’s (2016) findings. Giebl et al (2016) measured positivity bias using a similar 
procedure to Storm & Jobe 2012, in which the number of positive future events that could be constructed in 
response to 20 neutral cue words were compared to the number of negative events that could be constructed 
in response to a second set of 20 cue words. Using this method a significant correlation was found only 
between RIF and negative future episodic thinking, whereas correlations between RIF and positive future 
thinking did not reach significance. The use of only one condition in the current study, allowing participants 
to freely generate positive, neutral or negative events, may therefore explain the lack of a significant 
relationship emerging between RIF and valence of future episodic thinking, particularly given the strong 
positivity bias observed. However, given the strong relationship between episodic memory and future 
episodic thinking, it stands to reason that factors influencing memory valence may, directly or indirectly, 
influence the valence of future thinking. Indeed when the correlation between RIF and memory was 
compared with the correlation between RIF and future thinking, there was not a significant difference, 
reflecting the highly related nature of these two types of mental ‘time-travel’. As future thinking is less 
constrained than memory and more heavily influenced by additional factors (Sharot & Dolan, 2012), a 
greater level of power may have been required to detect a small relationship such as this.  
 
Overall, these findings contribute to a growing body of research indicating a relationship between mental 
wellbeing and positivity bias in valence of memories and future episodic thinking, alongside evidence that 
inhibitory mechanisms involved in RIF may enhance such positivity bias in healthy people. In depressed 
individuals it appears the opposite effect may occur, with RIF exacerbating negativity biases in memory. 
This suggests that reduced RIF may be a protective mechanism in depressed individuals, perhaps also 
contributing to over-general memory tendencies. It is worth considering the practical implications of these 
findings, particularly in relation to improving symptoms of depression and anxiety. Active engagement with 
positive remembering and future imagining may assist in mood repair (Harris et al., 2010, Quoidback et al. 
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2009), whilst further exploration the potential to modify cognitive biases in past and future thinking via 
active engagement with valenced material may be particularly valuable in therapeutic contexts (Woud & 
Becker, 2014; Murphy et al. 2011).  
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Appendix 1:  Remembering and future thinking tasks: 
 
  
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
Block A Grass Gigantic Wildlife Bread Search Pottery Ladder Occasion Nursery Shallow 
Block B Rhythm Rapid Youngest Bathe Fashion Refund Pianist Uncle Onion Library 
Autobiographical memory task instructions: You are now going to be presented with some words. For each word, please think of an event that happened to you which the word reminds you of. The event could have happened at any point in your life from when you were small to last week, please do not include memories from the past week.  It might be an important or trivial event, but the memory should be a specific event - an event that lasted less then a day and occurred in a particular time and place.   For example, if presented with the word 'daffodil', it would not be okay to write 'I remember the daffodils in my garden' because that is not a specific event, but it would be okay to write 'I remember picking daffodils for my mother's fiftieth birthday last year' (because that is a specific event).   Please write the memory event in the text box below each cue word. You may write as much or as little as you like, but try to include the specific details of the event.You will then be asked to rate the emotion (positive-negative) associated with that memory, and to give a rough estimate of how old you were when this event happened.  It is important to try to think of a different memory for each cue word. If you cannot think of a specific memory after approximately 1 minute you should move on to the next cue word. 
Future imagining task instructions You are now going to be presented with some words. For each word, please think of a future event that could happen to you related to that word. This event could be going to happen at any point in your life, but please do not include events imagined over the next week.  It might be an important or trivial event, but the imagined event should be a specific event - an event that will last less then a day and occur in a particular time and place.   For example, if presented with the word 'dog', it would not be okay to say 'walking my dog' as this is not a specific event. It would be okay to say 'walking my dog in the lake district with my daughter this summer holiday'.   Please write the imagined future event in the text box below each cue word. You may write as much or as little as you like, but try to include the specific details of the event. You will then be asked to rate the emotion (positive-negative) associated with that event, and give a rough estimate of how old you imagine yourself to be in the event you think of.     It is important to try to think of a different event for each cue word. If you cannot think of a specific event after approximately 1 minute you should move on to the next cue word. 
Cue words  
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